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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Julian Martin Valencia appeals from the judgment of conviction, arguing that the
district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In the early morning on January 27, 2013, Nampa Police Officer Krohn was
dispatched to a Nampa apartment in response to a report of a sex offense. (Conf. Exs.,
p.121.) Officer Krohn reported:
While I was enroute dispatch advised that the victim, Sara ... had fled the
address ... to a nearby address ... where another friend of hers lived. At
that time all Sara could provide was the suspect's name was, Julian, and
the suspect was her friend's boyfriend.
When we arrived on scene we made contact with Sara. We asked her if
we could come inside, so that she could explain what had occurred this
date. Sara told us that she is currently residing in Payette with her
parents, and she has a co-worker named Kayla . . . . Sara told us ... that
Kayla had told her in the past that anytime Sara wanted to sleep over at
her residence she was welcome to do so.
According to Sara, approximately a week and a half prior to this date her
and her daughter had stayed over at Kayla's house and Kayla's boyfriend
had even been present at that time as well, but nothing had happened.
According to Sara, on this date she dropped her daughter off at her sisters
house, and she went over to Kayla's house to stay the night so that she
could hang out with some friends and get to know some new people.
According to Sara, there was another couple on scene during the evening
time as well, and everyone in the residence was having some alcoholic
drinks. According to Sara, at approximately 0100 hours she went to bed
in one of Kayla's son's rooms. According to Sara, Kayla moved all of the
children out of the front bedroom and allowed Sara to sleep in the bed.
Sara borrowed a set of pajamas and at-shirt from Kayla to sleep in.
According to Sara, at close to 0500 hours, she woke up to find Kayla's
boyfriend, Julian (later identified as Julian M. Valencia,
was
laying on top of her and he was sticking his hands down her pants and
1

according to Sara she initially stated that he "approached her" and she
told him "no" and she told him to get off. Officer Pon asked Sara to clarify
what she meant when she stated that Julian had approached her. Sara
said, "He was putting his fingers inside my vagina." Sara also stated "he
tried to flip me over." Sara stated that at that time she began saying "no,
no, no" to Julian and told him to get off of her. Sara said that she told
Julian to get off of her or she was going to scream. According to Sara, at
that point Julian left the room and Sara got onto her phone and started
texting her ex-boyfriend. According to Sara, her ex-boyfriend told her to
get out of the house immediately and about that time Julian went to come
back into the room. Sara also stated that while Julian was sticking his
hands in her vagina he was telling her "I was to see you", and by that
according to Sara, he meant he wanted to see her naked body. !11
After Julian had left the room for the second time, Sara stated she
grabbed as much of her things that she could find and she exited the
room. Sara stated that the room she was in was right next to the front
door. She stated she ran straight from the room and out the front door.
According to Sara, Julian began following her out the door and chased her
all the way to the door of Sara's friend's apartment. All the way Julian was
telling Sara not to tell anyone and not to tell Kayla .... According to Sara,
as soon as she went to her friends apartment Julian headed back towards
his apartment.
... I asked her if there was anything specifically that Julian had said to her
while this was happening, and she stated that when he came back into the
room a second time he told her that "he just wanted a taste." Sara again
stated that she told him several times "no" and told him to get off of her
and get out.
(Cont. Exs., pp.121-122 (verbatim).)
Valencia was arrested and, upon being questioned by Nampa Police Department
Detective Palfreyman, Valencia "initially did not want to confirm that his fingers
penetrated Sara's vagina, but he later confirmed that happened one time during the
incident." (Conf. Exs., p.111.) Valencia admitted he "messed up," that he "was very

According to Nampa Police Department Detective Palfreyman, Sara "indicated that
[Valencia] then came back into the room moments later and penetrated her vagina
again with his fingers." (Conv. Exs., p.109.)
1
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sorry for what he did to Sara," and said "that was not the kind of person he normally is .
. . and [he] could not explain why he did what he did." (Id.)
The state filed a Criminal Complaint charging Valencia with battery with intent to
commit a serious felony (rape) and felony violation of a no contact order. (R., pp.8-10.)
Valencia was appointed counsel to represent him. (R., p.16.) Prior to the preliminary
hearing, the grand jury charged Valencia in a Superseding Indictment with only battery
with intent to commit a serious felony (rape), and Valencia pied not guilty to that charge.

(R., pp.20-21, 27-28.) On May 22, 2013, the district court granted a motion by Valencia
for substitute (retained) counsel. (R., pp.40-41.)
On July 11, 2013, pursuant to a plea agreement, Valencia entered an Alford plea
of guilty to the charge of battery with intent to commit a serious felony (rape).
pp.45-50; see generally 7/11/13 Tr.)

(R.,

In exchange, the state agreed to recommend a

sentence of four years fixed, with the indeterminate time left open for argument, and to
dismiss the felony violation of no contact order charges pending in case CR-20135380*C, which was assigned to a different judge.

(R., pp.46, 47, 50; 7/11/13 Tr., p.7,

L.12 - p.10, L.4.) Valencia was free to argue for a lesser sentence. (R., p.46; 7/11/13
Tr., p.7, L.19.) In his "Guilty Plea Advisory" form filed with the court, Valencia wrote (in
relevant part), "plea agreement & no file persistent ... dismiss 3 counts felony NCO."

(R., p.54 (capitalization modified).)

The district court ordered Valencia to undergo a

presentence interview and a psycho-sexual evaluation ("PSE"). (R., pp.49, 50, 58, 6165; 7/11/13 Tr., p.18, L.8-p.19, L.8.)
On September 10, 2013, the Presentence Investigator filed a Presentence
Report ("PSI"), stating Valencia

3

has an extensive criminal record and a history of non-compliance with
supervIsIon. Despite numerous opportunities for rehabilitation offered
through periods of probation, retained jurisdiction, incarceration and
parole, he persists with serious criminal offenses and substance abuse.
(PSI, p.20.) The PSI concluded that Valencia is a high risk to reoffend, is chemically
dependent on cannabis and amphetamine, and "would benefit from participation in
assessed rehabilitative programs ... and/or pro-

activities during a period of penal

incarceration to address his/her current attitudes/orientation and behaviors." (PSI, p.21

(emphasis added).)
Fifteen days later, on September 25, 2013, Valencia's retained trial counsel filed
a motion for leave to withdraw from the case, stating that "[Valencia] has requested
counsel to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the premise of ineffective
assistance of counsel. [Valencia] claims that counsel has failed to properly advise him
of potential consequences thus rendering his plea involuntary and unknowing."
p.66.)

(R.,

On September 27, 2013, the PSE was filed with the district court, which

concluded that Valencia is "very conning and manipulative," "possesses a high level of
psychopathy and ... is sexually deviant," is a "HIGH risk to engage in future unlawful
sexual behavior ... [and] [h)e can also be considered a HIGH risk to engage in future
criminal behaviors, not necessarily sexual in nature."

(PSE, pp.1-2 (capitalization

original).)
On October 21, 2013, at a hearing on Valencia's counsel's motion to withdraw
from the case, the court explained that Valencia had filed an ex parte motion expressing
his unhappiness about his retained counsel's representation of him, and threatening to

4

report counsel to the Idaho State Bar. 2 (10/21/13 Tr., p.5, L.25 - p.6, L.8.) Given the
"conflicting situation," the district court granted counsel's motion to withdraw and reappointed the public defender's office to represent Valencia. (R. pp.70-71; 10/21/13 Tr.,
p.8, L.15 - p.9, L.24.) The court reset the sentencing hearing to December 30, 2013,
and advised Valencia the continuance would allow him time to contact newly appointed
counsel and file whatever motions he felt appropriate.

(10/21/13 Tr., p.9, Ls.12-17.)

When Valencia said he had previously told his retained counsel that he wanted to
withdraw his plea, the court advised him to talk to his new attorney and "tell him what
you want done so he can do it." (Tr., p.9, L.18- p.10, L.25.)
On December 13, 2013, Valencia, through re-appointed counsel, filed a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. (R., pp.73-76.) The basis for Valencia's motion was as follows:
The Defendant felt pressured to accept the offered resolution and has
since determined that a jury trial would be a more appropriate resolution of
this case. After further reflection the Defendant has determined that the
Defendant should not enter a guilty plea to conduct at hand and the
Defendant does not feel the Defendant committed the crime as alleged.
(R., p.75.) At the December 30, 2013 hearing on Valencia's motion to withdraw his
guilty plea, his counsel explained:

2

That ex parte motion, dated September 21, 2013, states in relevant part, "I was
threatened with the 'persistent violator' statue [sic), to which I am not eligible for. I have
only been convicted with 'one' felony in my life, as an adult." (Motion to Withdraw Guilty
Plea, p.1, 12/4/14 Aug. Order.) The motion bears a stamp by a district court
"secretary," dated 10/3/13, which states, "Pursuant to Administrative Order #98-1, this
correspondence was opened by court personnel and has not been read or reviewed by
the judge." (Id., p.2.)
The district court also apparently received a letter from Valencia, dated
September 29, 2013, and file-stamped October 2, 2013, in which he complains about
trial counsel's performance, including counsel's failure to "revoc. [Valencia's] plea and
numerous complications." (Letter, p.1, 12/4/14 Aug. Order.)
5

. . . [M]y client was previously represented by counsel. I believe that in
that motion that he had withdrawn, that the Court has learned there was
some displeasure in how he represented my client. Part of that being,
Judge, is that some representations made to my client regarding the
persistent violator statute.
And one of the errors that I noticed is when I was previously
representing Julian is that one of the pretrial -- the little green sheet, it
mentions a previous felony out of Wisconsin. And he indicated to me that
that was not a felony. Also, in looking at the presentence investigation
completed in this matter, they do not recognize that, also. So there is only
the one prior felony, which we do recognize.
Part of what was resolved in this case is that my client entered a
plea under the understanding that the State would not be pursuing a
persistent violator. That being said, Judge, I know that part of the
representations that were made to Julian involved both cases at hand,
both the NCOs as well as the battery charge.
First off, my client had not been found guilty of any of those
charges. Part of the representation was made was that hey, if you're
found guilty of this NCO, they can use that against you. Looking at some
case law on point, specifically State v. Harrington, regarding when multiple
charges are charged and end up sentenced around the same date, they
are not considered separate convictions but instead one conviction for the
persistent violator statute.
(12/30/13 Tr., p.13, L.11 - p.14, L.19.) The district court noted that it appeared "there
was never any threat by the State to file the persistent violator because that was not
part of the plea agreement[,]" and the prosecutor agreed, stating "[i]t was not part of the
plea agreement."

(12/30/2013 Tr., p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.2.)

Valencia's trial counsel

argued that, even though "the persistent violator was not put on the record as far as part
of the deal in this case[,]" "there was, in both [prosecutors'] e-mails, responses to us!3l

By "us," it is apparent that the re-appointed public defender was referring to another
public defender ("Mr. Ferney") who had also previously (i.e., during the initial
appointment) engaged in discussions with prosecutors handling Valencia's case. (See
12/30/13 Tr., p.20, Ls.3-13.)
3
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and part of the resolution included the persistent violator and not pursuing a persistent
violator." (12/30/13 Tr., p.19, L.25 - p.20, L.13.)
After the parties presented arguments, the district court denied Valencia's motion
to withdraw his guilty plea, ruling:
The Court ... does note that prior counsel withdrew on September
25 of this year. The presentence investigation report was filed with the
Court on September 1ot\ 2013. Defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty
plea was not filed until after the public defender had the case again after
that, but certainly the presentence investigation report and the
psychosexual evaluation were available for review prior to those times.
The motion to withdraw the guilty plea was only filed after a very negative
psychosexual evaluation was performed and a presentence investigation
report that recommended prison.
th

At the time defendant entered his guilty plea, he was aware the
State would be recommending four fixed followed by an undetermined
amount of tail on that sentence. He reserved the right to argue for a
lesser offense at the time he entered that plea.
This Court does believe that there is prejudice to the State,
specifically prejudice to the victim in this case thinking this matter had
reached a resolution and the sentence was going forward.
And if the Court were to allow withdrawal of the plea, given the
length of time that his has been pending, the fact that the public defender
previously represented the defendant with regard to these charges, the
Court in its discretion is going to deny defendant's motion to withdraw the
guilty plea.
(12/30/13 Tr., p.21, L.2 - p.22, L.9.)
At a consolidated sentencing hearing, pursuant to the plea agreement, the district
court dismissed all three counts of felony violation of a no contact order in case CR2013-5380. (R., pp.54, 82; 1/10/13 Tr., p.24, Ls.5-8; p.34, Ls.15-17; see Idaho Data
Repository, Canyon County, Case No. CR-2013-5380-C.)

The court sentenced

Valencia to a unified ten years with four years fixed for his conviction for battery with
intent to commit a serious felony (rape). (R., pp.94-95.) Valencia filed a Rule 35 motion
7

to reconsider sentence (R., pp.86-93), which was denied (R., pp.110-113). Valencia
filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.100-103.)

8

ISSUE
Valencia states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr.
Valencia's motion to withdraw his guilty plea?
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Valencia failed to establish an abuse of discretion in the district court's
denial of his pre-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea?

9

ARGUMENT

Valencia Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Discretion In
Denying His Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea

A

Introduction
Valencia's written motion to withdraw his guilty plea asserted he "felt pressured to

accept the offered resolution and has since determined that a jury trial would be a more
appropriate resolution of this case," and he did "not feel [he] committed the crime as
alleged." (R., p.75.) At the hearing on that motion, Valencia's counsel verbally argues
that prior counsel had been ineffective in advising Valencia about the possibility of the
state bringing a persistent violator enhancement. (12/30/13 Tr., p.16, L.22 - p.17, L.2.)
Counsel accurately acknowledged Valencia faced multiple counts of felony violation of a
no contact order in a separate case.

(12/30/13 Tr., p.14, Ls.6-14; p.20, Ls.3-9.)

Valencia's counsel then argued, "Looking at some case law on point, specifically State
v. Harrington, regarding when multiple charges are charged and end up sentenced
around the same date, they are not considered separate convictions but instead one
conviction for the persistent violator statute." (12/30/13 Tr., p.14, Ls.14-19.) The district
court denied Valencia's motion to withdraw his plea, although it did not explicitly
address the verbal argument made by Valencia's trial counsel. 4
On appeal, Valencia correctly notes that, under State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho
563, 990 P.2d 144 (Ct. App. 1999), "[c]harges in the same information 'count as a single
conviction for purposes of establishing habitual offender status."'

4

(Appellant's Brief,

In denying Valencia's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the district court focused on
its determination that "[t]he motion to withdraw the guilty plea was only filed after a very
negative psychosexual evaluation was performed and a presentence investigation
report that recommended prison." (12/30/13 Tr., p.21, Ls.13-16.)
10

pp.10-11 (quoting Harrington, 133 Idaho at 565,990 P.2d at 146.) However, Valencia's
argument relies on the mistaken factual assertion that he was charged with multiple
felonies in this case, and ignores the fact that prior to his guilty plea in this case, he
faced three counts of felony violation of a no contact order in another case. Valencia's
argument fails because any representation by his trial counsel that the state could
potentially file a persistent violator charge was correct, and the plea agreement5 gave
Valencia the assurance that he would not be subjected to such a charge. 6

B.

Standard Of Review
"Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to

whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished from
arbitrary action." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536, 211 P.3d 775, 780-781
(2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 362, 941 P.2d 330, 334 (Ct. App.
1997)). A district court's factual findings are generally reviewed for clear error. !;&.,
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998); State v. Bush,
131 Idaho 22, 28, 951 P.2d 1249, 1255 (1997). An appellate court will defer to the trial
court's factual findings if they are supported by substantial competent evidence. !;&_,

The state assumes, arguendo, that Valencia believed the plea agreement included a
promise by the prosecutor to not file a persistent violator charge. (See R., p.54 (Guilty
Plea Advisory form stating "plea agreement & no file persistent ... dismiss 3 counts
felony NCO").)
5

Although the court did not make a specific finding that Valencia failed to present a just
reason for withdrawing his guilty plea, such a finding is implicit in the denial of
Valencia's motion to withdraw his plea. See State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 625, 726
P.2d 735, 737 (1986) (implicit findings of trial court should be overturned only if
unsupported by evidence); State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (Ct.
App. 1998) ("[A]ny implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence
should be given due deference.").
6
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State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 15 P.3d 1167 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho
254, 869 P.2d 571 (Ct. App. 1994).

C.

Valencia Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion In The Denial Of His
Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed by I.C.R. 33(c), which provides:
(c) Withdrawal of plea of guilty. A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may
be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is
suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may
set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw
defendant's plea.
Although a district court's discretion should be "liberally exercised" when ruling

on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea made prior to the pronouncement of sentence,
withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an automatic right. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211
P.3d at 780. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 787 P.2d 281, 284 (1990). Rather,
"the defendant has the burden of showing a 'just reason' exists to withdraw the plea."
Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780 (citations omitted).

Failure to present

and support a just or plausible reason, even absent prejudice to the prosecution, will
weigh against granting withdrawal. State v. Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 647, 84 P.3d 579,
583 (Ct. App. 2004).

"[T]he good faith, credibility, and weight of the defendant's

assertions in support of his motion to withdraw his plea are matters for the trial court to
decide." Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 537, 211 P.3d at 782 (citations omitted). Valencia
failed to meet his burden of demonstrating a just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea.
First, although Valencia's trial counsel correctly acknowledged the fact that
Valencia faced multiple charges of felony violation of a no contact order in a separate
case, counsel's legal argument that, under Harrington, "when multiple charges are
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charged and end up sentenced around the same date, they are not considered separate
convictions but instead one conviction for the persistent violator statute" (12/30/13 Tr.,
p.14, Ls.14-19) is misplaced.

Trial counsel's statement that multiple charges

"sentenced around the same date" count only as "one conviction for the persistent
violator statue" (id.) has no support in law, nor has any been presented on appeal. The
accurate statement of law is that charges in the same information "count as a single
conviction for purposes of establishing habitual offender status." State v. Harrington,
133 Idaho 563, 565, 990 P.2d 144 (Ct. App. 1999). Valencia's argument at the hearing
on his motion to withdraw his plea was simply based on an incorrect legal premise, and
the district court properly denied the motion.
In his argument on appeal, Valencia recites the correct legal principle that
convictions entered the same day or charged in the same information should count as a
single conviction for purposes of establishing habitual offender status under I.C. § 192514. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.10-11); State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 341,344, 715 P.2d
1011, 1014 (Ct. App.1988). However, Valencia relies upon an errant view of the facts.
Valencia bases his entire argument on the premise that he was charged in the
Superseding Indictment in this case with two felony charges -- battery with intent to
commit a serious felony (rape) and violation of a no contact order. Further, Valencia
ignores the fact that, contemporaneous with this case, he was charged with three
counts of felony violation of a no contact order in another case. His explanation of the
underlying principal of his claim bears repeating:
Mr. Valencia believed that he could be subject to the persistent violator
statute if he did not plead guilty because his original counsel ... led him to
believe that the two charges he was facing would amount to his second
and third felonies for the purpose of the persistent violator statute. This
13

was not supported by the law. Charges in the same information "count as
a single conviction for purposes of establishing habitual offender status."
State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563, 565 (Ct. App. 1999). Thus, Mr.
Valencia was not at risk of being subject to the persistent violator statute
as he believed.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.10-11 (quoting Harrington, 133 Idaho at 565, 990 P.2d at 146);
emphasis added.)
Valencia's argument is based on a factual error. In this case (Canyon County
Case No. CR-2013-287 4-C), the second charge of the Criminal Complaint -- felony
violation of a no contact order (see R., pp.8-10) -- was not included in the Superseding
Indictment.

(R., pp.20-21; see R., pp.27-28, 45-50.)

At the same time Valencia's

battery with intent to commit a serious felony (rape) charge in this case was pending, he
faced three felony counts of violating a no contact order in a separate case, with a
different judge -- Canyon County Case No. CR-2013-5380-C - the very charges the
prosecutor agreed to dismiss as part of an overall plea agreement covering both cases.
(R., pp.54, 82; 1/10/13 Tr., p.24, Ls.5-8; p.34, Ls.15-17; see Idaho Data Repository,

Canyon County, Case No. CR-2013-5380-C.)
There is no dispute that Valencia's first felony conviction occurred in 2005, when
he was convicted of felony possession of a controlled substance. (See PSI, pp.9, 13.)
If Valencia had been convicted of any one of the three felony offenses pending in case
CR-2013-5380-C prior to trial in this case, he could have been charged as a persistent
violator in this case.

Likewise, a conviction at trial in this case would have made

Valencia eligible for the persistent violator enhancement charge in the other pending
case. Thus, the record establishes that by resolving both pending felony cases in a
single plea agreement Valencia avoided a persistent violator charge.

14

In sum, Valencia's trial counsel's advice that Valencia could avoid a persistent
violator charge by accepting the plea offer was accurate. Once the three felony charges
in the other case were dismissed, Valencia received the full benefit of his plea
agreement by insuring he would not be charged in either case as a persistent violator.7
Valencia failed to meet his burden of showing any just reason to withdraw his guilty
plea, and that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion.

The

judgment of the district court should therefore be affirmed.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's denial of
Valencia's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
DATED this 29 th day of December, 2014.

JO I C. McKINNEY (
De uty Attorney Gene

7

In regard to "prejudice" to the prosecution, the state relies in full on the district court's
following comments, delivered at the end of the hearing on Valencia's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea:
This Court does believe that there is prejudice to the State,
specifically prejudice to the victim in this case thinking this matter had
reached a resolution and the sentence was going forward.
And if the Court were to allow withdrawal of the plea, given the
length of time that this has been pending ... , the Court in its discretion is
going to deny defendant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
(12/30/13 Tr., p.21, L.23 - p.22, L.9.)

15
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 29th day of December, 2014, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
REED P. ANDERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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